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TRANS-ATLANTIC REACH: THE POTENTIAL 
IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NEW 
CHEMICAL REGULATIONS ON PROOF OF 
CAUSATION IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 
Leslie E. Kersey*
Abstract: On June 1, 2007, a new set of regulations governing nearly all 
chemical substances took effect throughout the EU's twenty-seven mem-
ber states. The primary goal of the legislation, called REACH, is to im-
prove the protection of human health and the environment from risks 
posed by toxic chemical exposure. No equivalent federal legislation ex-
ists in the United States. As a result, chemicals that the EU will soon ban 
or restrict under REACH will continue to enter American homes and 
workplaces. This Note explores how private law—particularly in the 
form of toxic tort litigation—may fill the gap in U.S. chemicals regula-
tion, and induce manufacturers to produce safer products for U.S. con-
sumption. Focusing on the potential of REACH to influence the estab-
lishment of general causation in toxic tort litigation, it analyzes whether 
and to what extent REACH data is likely to assist toxic tort plaintiffs in 
U.S. federal courts.  The Note concludes that, although REACH is likely 
to provide plaintiffs with additional evidentiary support of general cau-
sation in some instances, it seems unlikely that REACH data alone will 
be sufficient to support causation claims at the federal level. 
Introduction 
 We live in a world of chemicals. From household cleaners to chil-
dren’s toys, to shower curtains, lipstick, and nail polish, chemicals 
comprise tens of thousands of consumer and commercial products— 
they are the ingredients in the conveniences of modern society.1
                                                                                                                      
* Clinical Program Director, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2008–09. The author wishes to thank Professors Mark S. Brodin, Jane Kent Gionfriddo, 
Dean M. Hashimoto, Vlad Perju, Zygmunt J.B. Plater, and David A. Wirth for their guid-
ance and feedback, and her family for their encouragement and support. 
1 See Richard A. Denison, Not That Innocent: A Comparative Analysis of Cana-
dian, European Union and United States Policies on Industrial Chemicals, at iii–iv, 
I-4 (2007), available at www.edf.org/documents/6149_NotThatInnocent_Fullreport.pdf; Mark 
Schapiro, Exposed: The Toxic Chemistry of Everyday Products and What’s at Stake 
for American Power 3 (2007). 
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 Despite the widespread use of chemical substances, for more than 
fifty years government policies have allowed the production and impor-
tation of an overwhelming majority of chemicals without questioning 
their safety, even though governments, consumers, and chemical 
manufacturers have known little to nothing about the health and envi-
ronmental risks that everyday chemicals might pose.2 In recent years, 
however, scientific studies have provided evidence that our presump-
tions of chemical safety were often wrong.3
 As science has focused increasingly on the effects of long-term ex-
posure to everyday chemical-containing products, it has become clear 
that our world of chemicals and convenience comes with serious health 
and environmental consequences.4 “We now know that some of these 
chemicals have accumulated in the bodies of virtually all people, and in 
wildlife and the ecosystems of the remotest regions on Earth.”5 Results 
from a 2005 cross-generational study by the U.S. Center for Disease 
Control revealed the accumulation of nearly 150 toxic chemicals “in 
the bodies of Americans of all ages.”6 Supported by wildlife, animal, 
                                                                                                                      
2 Denison, supra note 1, at iii–iv, I-4 (“In most cases, we [have] lack[ed] the informa-
tion needed to determine which chemicals are safe, whether the observed accumulation of 
chemicals in the environment and human bodies poses serious risk, and whether the me-
thods employed to manage chemicals are sufficient to minimize the risks.”); see Schapiro, 
supra note 1, at 136–37. In 1976, Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA) to regulate the introduction of new or already existing chemicals. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601–2692 (2002). Though at the time the U.S. chemical safety standards were viewed 
as pioneering regulation, TSCA grandfathered more than 60,000 chemicals into the U.S. 
market. See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 132. Among chemicals exempted from the legisla-
tion were “thousands of potentially highly toxic substances, including the likes of ethyl 
benzene, a widely used industrial solvent suspected of being a potent neurotoxin,” and 
“whole families of synthetic plastics that are potential carcinogens and endocrine disrupt-
ers . . . .” Id. In TSCA’s thirty-year history, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has banned a mere five chemicals. Id. at 133. 
The [U.S.] Government Accountability Office concluded in 2005 that the 
[EPA] has inadequate test data to make safety assessments, and has permitted 
the chemical industry too much leeway in keeping information from public 
view by indiscriminate assertion of proprietary information. The require-
ments that the EPA include the costs to industry in determining whether a 
substance presents an unreasonable threat to public health, and that it im-
pose the least burdensome regulation (to industry) was a bar that the GAO 
found too high for effective protection from chemicals’ potential harm. 
Id. (citing Gov’t Accountability Office, No. GAO-05-458, Chemical Regulation: Op-
tions Exist to Improve EPA’s Ability to Assess Health Risks and Manage Its 
Chemical Review Program (2005) (internal quotations omitted)). 
3 See Denison, supra note 1, at iii. See generally Schapiro, supra note 1. 
4 See Denison, supra note 1, at iii. See generally Schapiro, supra note 1. 
5 Denison, supra note 1, at iii. 
6 Schapiro, supra note 1, at 3 (internal quotations omitted). 
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and human studies, moreover, scientists suggest that exposure to even 
low-level contaminants is causally linked to increasing rates of cancers, 
reproductive disorders, and neurological diseases, which affect millions 
of people worldwide.7 Alarmingly, a recent World Health Organization 
estimate partly attributes the deaths of at least five million people per 
year to exposure to toxic chemicals.8
 For nearly a decade, as more scientific studies have observed the 
carcinogenic, mutagenic, and neurotoxic effects of human exposure to 
chemicals, European Union (EU) legislators have worked towards the 
implementation of a new set of regulations to govern the EU-market 
presence of nearly all chemical substances.9 The resulting legislation— 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH)—took effect throughout the EU’s twenty-seven member 
states on June 1, 2007.10 Now the world’s strictest chemical safety re-
gime,11 REACH’s primary goal is to improve the protection of human 
health and the environment from risks posed by toxic chemical expo-
sure.12 To achieve this objective, REACH will require generation of en-
                                                                                                                      
7 See id. at 3–4. For example, based on extensive peer-reviewed scientific studies, many 
scientists now believe that early exposure to phthalates—a member of the polyvinyl-
chloride plastic softener family—can cause reproductive deformations such as lower testos-
terone levels and sperm counts, incompletely descended testes, and hypospadias. See id. at 
42, 44–45. Exposure to phthalates can come from a multitude of sources, including “dust 
in the air, . . . plasticized wall coverings or flooring, . . . [and] plastic toys and teething 
rings.” Id. at 43. Studies also have linked exposure to perfluorinated chemicals, like those 
used in Teflon pans, to liver damage and “increased risk of bladder and possibly other 
cancers.” Id. at 128. These are just two of thousands of examples of the potentially serious 
health consequences of everyday exposure to chemical substances. See generally id. 
8 Id. at 3–4. 
9 See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 4, 137; Andrew Austin & Paul Bowden, REACH: What 
the EU’s New Chemical Reforms Mean for Consumer Products Companies 1 (2007), 
available at http://freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2007/aug06/19637.pdf. 
10 Austin & Bowden, supra note 9, at 1; see European Parliament and Council Regulation 
1907/2006, Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (EC), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=oj:l:2006:396:0001: 
0849:en:pdf [hereinafter REACH]. It is important to note that, because REACH is only in its 
initial implementation phase, “many critical elements of REACH remain to be developed, 
and how all of its provisions will work in practice remains to be seen.” Denison, supra note 1, 
at I-6. For an account of the intense lobbying by chemicals manufacturers worldwide, and 
even by the U.S. government, that accompanied the REACH development process, see 
Schapiro, supra note 1, at 143–55. 
11 David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31 Fletcher F. 
World Aff. 91, 100 (2007); see Schapiro, supra note 1, at 139. 
12 Enterprise and Industry Directorate General and Environment Directorate 
General, European Commission, REACH in Brief 4 (2006), http://ecb.jrc.it/documents/ 
REACH/REACH_in_brief_council_comm_pos_060905.pdf [hereinafter REACH in Brief]. 
REACH also aims to enhance the competitiveness of the chemicals industry in Europe. Id. 
538 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:535 
vironment- and health-toxicity data on the majority of chemicals used 
in modern society.13
 By substantially improving the chemical health and safety informa-
tion available to manufacturers, regulators, and the public, REACH 
promises to confer significant health and environmental benefits on 
European consumers.14 As Stavros Dimas, the EU Commissioner for 
the Environment, has stated: 
If REACH succeeds in reducing chemicals-related diseases by 
only 10 per cent, which is a conservative assumption, the 
health benefits are estimated at more than €50 billion ($64 
billion) over 30 years. This means tens of thousands of 
avoided cases of infertility, cancer, skin diseases, neurological 
disorders and other illnesses.15
 Even in its early stages, REACH has impacted manufacturers 
throughout the world, including American producers of chemical sub-
stances.16 Because chemicals and chemical-containing products made in 
the United States for export to the EU must meet the same standards as 
their European-made counterparts, the EU’s new chemicals regulations 
confront U.S. companies with a choice: “either adapt to Europe’s more 
aggressive standards for protecting the health of its citizens, or risk los-
ing what is now the biggest and most affluent market in the world.”17 
While some companies are choosing to replace dangerous chemicals 
with safer alternatives in products for both U.S. and European con-
sumption, many U.S. companies that have adapted their products to 
comply with the EU’s higher standards maintain that they are unable to 
make the same changes for American consumers—and continue to take 
advantage of less rigorous chemicals regulation in the United States.18
 Whether REACH will eventually influence Congress to adopt legis-
lation similar to the EU’s new chemicals rules remains to be seen.19 No-
                                                                                                                      
13 See Philip E. Karmel, The New European Chemicals Law, N.Y. L. J. (Aug. 6, 2007), available 
at http://www.bryancave.com/bulletins/list.aspx?Date=2007 (follow hyperlink to article). 
14 See generally Schapiro, supra note 1. 
15 Austin & Bowden, supra note 9, at 1 (quoting Stavros Dimas, EU Commissioner for 
the Environment, Speech at the American Chamber of Commerce in the EU: Climate 
Change and REACH ( July 19, 2005)). 
16 See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 157. “U.S. firms sell about $27 billion a year in chemi-
cals to Europe . . . .” Id. at 139. For a discussion of the worldwide economic impact of 
REACH, see id. 
17 See id. at 10. 
18 Id. at 10–11. 
19 See id. at 10–11, 157. 
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tably, while the EU marched forward, creating new protections for its 
citizens, the United States steadfastly regarded these changes with an 
icy glare:20 from the time REACH was just a proposal in Europe, the 
official policy of the U.S. executive branch has been to vociferously op-
pose the new regulations.21 Thus, for the time being, chemicals that 
soon will be banned or restricted in the EU under REACH will con-
tinue to enter the American market—as well as American homes and 
workplaces.22
 Fortunately for Americans, 
[t]he United States has long had two legs to its structure of 
consumer protections: regulation on the one hand, and a re-
ceptive legal system on the other, giving citizens the right to 
pursue redress in the courts as a means of obtaining both 
compensation and punishment for damages to their . . . health 
and environment.23
Therefore, while U.S. public law may leave Americans exposed to dan-
gerous chemicals for the time being, private law, particularly in the 
form of toxic tort litigation, could prove a powerful inducement to 
manufacturers to produce safer products for U.S. consumption.24 His-
torically, the prospect of litigation has been a powerful deterrent, forc-
ing manufacturers at the very least to assess, and sometimes to internal-
ize, the costs associated with failures to adequately protect consumers.25 
Thus, “[b]y requiring the generation of massive amounts of new data 
                                                                                                                      
20 See id. at 143–54. 
21 See Schapiro, supra note, at 145 & n.38 (citing Minority Staff of H. Comm. on 
Government Reform, A Special Interest Case Study: The Chemical Industry, the 
Bush Administration, and European Efforts to Regulate Chemicals, at i–ii (Apr. 1, 
2004), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040817125807-75305.pdf). 
22 See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 142. In response to REACH, the Bush administration 
launched “an unprecedented international lobbying effort . . . to block [the new European 
legislation] from being passed into law.” Id. at 145. While it appears that, for the foresee-
able future, U.S. federal law will continue to deny Americans protections comparable to 
those that REACH will afford Europeans, a few U.S. states, including California, Massachu-
setts, and New York, “have begun implementing elements of REACH into their state regu-
lations; other states, such as Maine and Washington, have cited Europe’s precedent in 
their efforts to ban particular chemicals.” Id. at 188. 
23 Id. at 36. 
24 See id. at 37. 
25 Id. Some notable defendant-corporations include “Dow Corning (silicone breast 
implants), Merck (Vioxx pain reliever), the Ford Motor Company (the Pinto), AH Robins 
(the Dalkon Shield contraceptive), WR Grace (asbestos), and Philip Morris (tobacco).” Id. 
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on the health risks of chemicals,” REACH may equip plaintiffs with 
valuable evidence in support of toxic tort claims.26
 Focusing exclusively on the potential of REACH to influence the 
establishment of general causation in toxic tort litigation, this Note ex-
plores whether and to what extent REACH data is likely to assist toxic 
tort plaintiffs in U.S. federal courts.27 Part I provides a detailed explana-
tion of REACH provisions pertinent to this inquiry. Part II discusses 
toxic tort litigation, as well as the types of evidence most commonly re-
lied upon in both the scientific and legal realms to infer causal links be-
tween toxic agents and human disease. Part III describes the standards 
that U.S. federal courts apply in decisions on the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence and expert testimony, while Part IV surveys how courts 
have applied admissibility standards in the context of toxic tort litiga-
tion. Part V analyzes the likelihood that REACH data will assist plaintiffs 
in proving general causation. This Part specifically considers the issues 
of inclusion, accessibility, reliability, and admissibility of REACH data. 
The Conclusion of this Note suggests that, while REACH is likely to pro-
vide plaintiffs with additional evidentiary support of general causation 
in some instances, it seems unlikely that REACH data alone will be suffi-
cient to support causation claims in federal courts. 
I. REACH: The EU’s Regulatory Response 
 REACH represents an overhaul of European chemicals regulations 
promulgated in the early 1980s.28 REACH’s predecessor regulations 
closely mirrored the United States’s Toxic Substance Control Act 
(TSCA) of 1976, which remains in effect today.29 The old European 
regulations failed to provide an adequate basis for understanding the 
potential risks posed by chemicals.30 Under the former EU chemicals 
regime, no data were available on the impact of ninety-nine percent of 
the 30,000 substances currently on the EU market because the old rules 
exempted from testing requirements chemical substances “existing” at 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Karmel, supra note 13. 
27 The author recognizes the potential for REACH data in general, and European 
Chemicals Agency (ECHA) decisions in particular, to impact the establishment of more 
than one prima facie element of toxic tort suits involving chemicals regulated by REACH. 
It is beyond the scope of this Note, however, to address issues of breach and duty. 
28Schapiro, supra note 1, at 137; Austin & Bowden, supra note 9, at 1. 
29 See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 132. For a detailed comparison of TSCA and REACH, 
see generally Denison, supra note 1. 
30 REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 3. 
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the time of regulation.31 Moreover, public authorities rarely acquired 
adequate safety data on new chemical substances because pre-REACH 
regulations required government to point to “information sufficient to 
document potential risk, or at the very least, extensive exposure” before 
it could require manufacturers to submit risk data on products for the 
assessment of actual risk.32 Because the former legislation only set out 
general guidelines for manufacturers in providing safety information to 
the government, chemical producers typically submitted little, if any, 
data on risk and toxicity and, as a result, public authorities rarely pro-
cured the evidence needed to mandate further testing.33 Thus, under 
the old system, not only governments but even manufacturers some-
times were unaware of the properties of chemicals used in products.34
 REACH aims to diminish the information deficit by acquiring spe-
cific environment- and health-toxicity data on most of the chemicals 
used in modern society.35 By conservative estimates, REACH will lead to 
the development of €10 billion in toxicity and exposure data in the 
next two decades.36 To accomplish its goals, REACH requires importers 
and manufacturers to supply “scientifically valid” health and safety data 
on the chemical substances they import and/or produce.37 Notably, 
industry, rather than government, is responsible for developing data 
that demonstrate that chemicals can be used safely.38
                                                                                                                      
31 See Austin & Bowden, supra note 9, at 1. 
32 See Denison, supra note 1, at iii. From 1993 to 2007, the EU ordered risk assessments 
on only 141 high-volume “new” chemicals. REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 3. 
33 See Denison, supra note 1, at v. 
34 Id. at iii–iv; Schapiro, supra note 1, at 136. 
35 Austin & Bowden, supra note 9, at 1; Karmel, supra note 13. “All substances are cov-
ered by [REACH] unless they are explicitly exempted from its scope.” REACH in Brief, 
supra note 12, at 5. Some REACH exemptions include medicinal products and cosmetics, 
which are already regulated under comprehensive EU directives. REACH, supra note 10, 
art. 2, ¶ 6(a)–(b). Also exempted are substances that “generally present such low risks as 
not to require registration, like water [and] oxygen.” REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 6. 
36 See Karmel, supra note 13. 
37 REACH, supra note 10, pmbl. ¶ 64; see REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 5. 
38 REACH, supra note 11, pmbl. ¶¶ 18–19; Denison, supra note 1, at I-7 to -8. Thus, the 
new regulations “[flip] the . . . [old] presumption of innocent until proven guilty on its 
head . . . .” Schapiro, supra note 1, at 138. 
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A. The REACH Process: Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and 
Restriction of Chemicals 
 REACH substantially eliminates distinctions previously made be-
tween “new” and “existing” chemicals39 and requires all importers and 
manufacturers of chemicals produced or used in quantities exceeding 
one ton per year to register with the new European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA, or, the Agency).40 Failure on the part of manufacturers to sub-
mit the appropriate registration materials to ECHA will result in a ban 
on the manufacture or import of unregistered or improperly registered 
substances.41
 To register, manufacturers must submit technical dossiers contain-
ing information on the identities, properties, and uses of substances 
they produce.42 Manufacturers must also disclose relevant hazard classi-
fications and labeling requirements and must provide guidance on the 
safe use of substances.43 Further, technical dossiers should summarize 
any existing pertinent hazard information, as well as details and results 
from new studies and information on testing proposals.44 REACH 
mandates that “one or more competent person(s) who have appropri-
ate experience and received appropriate training” shall prepare chemi-
cal safety assessments, which compare possible negative effects of sub-
                                                                                                                      
39 Notably, while “new” chemicals—those for which production began after REACH 
took effect—must be registered immediately, registration requirements are to be phased in 
over time for those chemicals existing prior to the implementation of REACH. REACH in 
Brief, supra note 12, at 5. Registration deadlines differ based on tonnage and other factors 
for so-called “phase-in” substances. Id. at 5, 7. For example, substances manufactured at 
1000 metric tons per year or more must be registered by December 1, 2010, while sub-
stances manufactured at one metric ton per year or more that are not considered carcino-
gens, mutagens, or reproductive toxins may delay registration until June 1, 2018. REACH, 
supra note 10, art. 23, ¶¶ 1(c), 3; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-27. 
40 REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. REACH provides that ECHA shall handle the 
“technical, scientific, and administrative aspects of the REACH system” for the European 
Community, ensuring that the new regulations are taken seriously and implemented prop-
erly. Id. at 6. Manufacturers of chemical-containing products also must submit health and 
safety data on substances used where:(1) the manufacturer has yet to register the sub-
stance for that use; (2) the substance is present in the article in quantities totaling more 
than one metric ton per year per producer or importer; and (3) the substance is intended 
to be released from the article under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use. 
REACH, supra note 10, art. 7, ¶ 1(a)–(b); Denison, supra note 1, at IV-26. 
41 Schapiro, supra note 1, at 137; see REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 6. This is 
sometimes referred to as the “no data, no market principle.” Denison, supra note 1, at I-6; 
Karmel, supra note 13. 
42 Denison, supra note 1, at IV-26; REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. 
43 Denison, supra note 1, at IV-26; REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. 
44 Denison, supra note 1, at IV-26; REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. 
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stances “with the known or reasonably foreseeable exposure of man . . . 
to [those] substance[s],” given a variety of exposure scenarios.45
 The scope of information REACH requires varies according to the 
tonnage of the manufactured or imported substance; an increase in the 
marketed quantity of a substance automatically triggers additional in-
formation requirements.46 For example, the dossiers of substances pro-
duced in quantities of ten metric tons or more per year must also con-
tain chemical safety reports (CSRs). These reports detail information 
about the physiochemical, toxicological, and ecotoxicological proper-
ties of substances, the risks posed by their use, and whether and any 
risks may be adequately controlled.47 CSRs are intended to supply 
ECHA with adequate data to evaluate whether a particular substance 
should be classified as “persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic” (PBT) 
or “very persistent and very bioaccumulative” (vPvB).48 PBTs can cause 
a wide range of serious health problems, including “cancer, endocrine 
disruption, reproductive dysfunction, behavioral abnormalities, birth 
defects, disturbance of the immune system, [and] damage to the liver 
and nervous system.”49 REACH further requires data on human and 
animal exposure risks for substances identified as PBTs or vPvBs.50
 Additionally, REACH requires applicants registering such sub-
stances of “high concern” to analyze whether safer, suitable alternatives 
or technologies exist.51 Substances determined to pose “potentially sig-
nificant threat[s] to human health or the environment” —namely, 
                                                                                                                      
45 REACH, supra note 10, Annex I, ¶¶ 0.2–0.3. 
46 Id. art. 12, ¶¶ 1–2; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-26. Detailed information on 
the various data requirements associated with each tonnage tier can be found in the 
REACH annexes. Denison, supra note 1, at IV-4. Tonnages are calculated per manufac-
turer or importer. Id. at IV-4 n.73. 
47 REACH, supra note 10, art. 14, ¶¶ 3–4, 6; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. 
CSRs contain human health hazard assessments, which measure the absorption, metabo-
lism, distribution, and elimination of substances, as well as acute effects, sensitization, re-
peated dose toxicity, and CMR—carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, and reproductive toxicity—
effects. REACH, supra note 10, Annex I, ¶ 1.02. 
48 Id. ¶ 0.6; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. “PBT pollutants are chemicals that 
are toxic, persist in the environment and bioaccumulate in food chains and, thus, pose 
risks to human health and ecosystems. The biggest concerns about PBTs are that they 
transfer rather easily among air, water, and land, and span boundaries of programs, geog-
raphy, and generations.” U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Persistent Bioaccumulative and Toxic 
(PBT) Chemical Program, http://www.epa.gov/pbt/pubs/aboutpbt.htm (last visited Mar. 
19, 2009). 
49 Stefan Weigel, Persistent Bioaccumulative and Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, http://www. 
pollutionissues.com/Na-Ph/Persistent-Bioaccumulative-and-Toxic-PBT-Chemicals.html 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2009). 
50 REACH, supra note 10, Annex I, ¶¶ 0.7, 1.02; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. 
51 REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 5. 
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PBTs, vPvBs, substances with endocrine-disrupting properties, and car-
cinogenic, mutagenic, and reproductive toxins—require specific ECHA 
authorization before they can appear on the European market.52
 Annexes to REACH specify the scientific methodologies upon 
which registrants are to rely in acquiring requisite data.53 Depending 
on the quantity and properties of the chemical in question, REACH 
requires that registration dossiers contain data based on scientific stud-
ies involving animal toxicology (in vivo testing), in vitro studies (Petri 
dish or test tube studies on cells, organs, and sometimes embryos), 
and/or structure-activity relationships (SARs) analysis.54
 While REACH provides standard guidelines for developing data 
for the registration process, in many instances it allows manufacturers 
to deviate from these standard testing regimes in their studies, provided 
that they clearly explain how their analysis and methodologies differ 
from REACH guidelines and why such adaptations are justified.55 Spe-
cifically, REACH states that when certain conditions are met, manufac-
turers may omit data, replace it with other information, provide it at a 
different stage, or adapt it in a different way.”56 Further, registrants can 
submit statements as to why they should be exempt from testing re-
quirements altogether, citing a lack of necessity or feasibility.57 While 
registrants are expected to apply Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) 
standards for toxicological and eco-toxicological studies and assess-
ments, in many other instances, registrants may satisfy data require-
ments using “nonstandard methods.”58 Finally, REACH encourages reg-
istrants to substitute direct testing methods, such as live animal studies, 
with in vitro data, SAR modeling, and weight-of-evidence approaches.59
                                                                                                                      
52 Austin & Bowden, supra note 9, at 3. 
53 See, e.g., REACH, supra note 10, Annex VIII. 
54 See, e.g., id., Annexes VIII, XI & ¶¶ 1.3–1.4; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. 
55 See REACH, supra note 10, Annexes VII–X; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28 to 
-29. 
56 Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28 & n.145 (“This language appears in the introduction 
to each of the [REACH] Annexes VII-X.”). 
57 REACH, supra note 10, Annex XI; Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. 
58 Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28; see REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. GLP stan-
dards concern “the selection and handling of laboratory animals, the number of animals 
per cage, their diet, the statistical procedures to be used, etc. . . . . Adherence to GLP in 
routine safety assessment is the norm and is subject to examination in litigation.” David L. 
Faigman et al., Science in the Law: Standards, Statistics and Research Issues 387 
(2002). 
59 See REACH, supra note 10, Annexes VII–X; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28 to 
-29. 
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 REACH provisions which permit adaptations to testing method-
ologies reflect the legislation’s express purpose of replacing, reducing, 
or refining animal testing wherever possible and scientifically justifi-
able.60 These allowances are intended to address concerns about both 
animal protection and industry costs.61 Accordingly, REACH also en-
courages registrants to submit existing information in lieu of conduct-
ing new tests.62 REACH requires new tests only when alternative possi-
bilities have been exhausted.63 For instance, “[f]or substances in 
quantities of 100 tonnes per year or more (i.e. cases where more ex-
pensive tests, many on vertebrate animals, may be necessary), the 
manufacturer or importer who does not already possess the required 
information only needs to submit proposals for testing.”64
 While REACH requires ECHA to examine all submitted testing 
proposals, the Agency is responsible for subjecting only “a percentage” 
of registrations to further evaluation.65 Evaluation is the process by 
which ECHA determines whether the data submitted are reliable and 
accurate.66 In conjunction with EU member states, ECHA is tasked with 
developing criteria for prioritizing substances for further evaluation 
which take into account hazard and exposure information, as well as 
tonnage.67
 Based upon evaluations of registered data, ECHA may request in-
formation beyond that required by the registration provisions of 
REACH.68 However, ECHA must first seek the approval of EU member 
states.69 Moreover, REACH grants registrants the opportunity to com-
ment on and appeal requests for additional information.70
 Where the evaluation process raises Agency concerns that a sub-
stance possesses substantial environmental or human health risks, 
ECHA must grant explicit authorization before registrants may proceed 
to manufacture or import that substance into the EU.71 Upon further 
                                                                                                                      
60 Denison, supra note 1, at IV-29. 
61 Id.; see REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. 
62 See REACH, supra note 10, Annexes VII–X. 
63 REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. 
64 Dep’t for Env’t Food & Rural Affairs, Environmental Protection: Chemicals, http:// 
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/chemicals/reach/qanda/registration.htm (last visited Mar. 
24, 2009) [hereinafter DEFRA]; see REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 7. 
65 REACH, supra note 10, pmbl. ¶ 65. 
66 Id.; see REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 11–12. 
67 REACH, supra note 10, art. 44, ¶ 1. 
68 Id., pmbl. ¶ 66. 
69 Id., arts. 46, 50, 52; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. 
70 REACH, supra note 10, art. 50; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. 
71 REACH, supra note 10, art. 56. 
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analysis, the Agency may choose to restrict or altogether ban the pro-
duction or importation of the substance to avoid exposures dangerous 
to humans and the environment.72 Substances most likely to be subject 
to ECHA bans or restrictions include those satisfying criteria for classi-
fication as carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens, endocrine disrupters, 
PBTs, and vPvBs.73
B. Public Access to REACH Data 
 REACH substantially limits the data that companies can claim as 
proprietary.74 ECHA is responsible for making publicly available, via 
the internet, much of the health and environmental safety data pre-
pared for it by chemical manufacturers.75 REACH will always make the 
following categories of information available, free of charge: (1) the 
name of the substance; (2) the classification and labeling of the sub-
stance; (3) physicochemical data concerning the substance, exposure 
pathways, and environmental fate; (4) the result of each toxicological 
and ecotoxicological study; and (5) analytical methods, if requested, 
which make it possible to detect a dangerous substance when dis-
charged into the environment, as well as to determine the direct expo-
sure risks for humans.76
 In some instances, however, REACH grants manufacturers an op-
portunity to submit justifications for why ECHA should not disclose reg-
istered information.77 If the Agency deems those reasons valid, study 
summaries or robust study summaries of toxicological data and the 
trade name of the substance may remain undisclosed.78 Further, ECHA 
will automatically classify certain REACH data, such as specific details 
on a preparation’s full composition, as “confidential business informa-
tion” (CBI).79 Access to that information will be granted only “where 
                                                                                                                      
72 See REACH in Brief, supra note 12, at 12–13. 
73 REACH, supra note 10, art. 57. 
74 Schapiro, supra note 1, at 138. 
75 See REACH, supra note 10, art. 119. Notably, though the official TSCA website notes 
that most public libraries own copies of the TSCA inventory, the U.S. government charges 
$161 through its website for consumers to purchase their own searchable CD-ROM copy. 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, New Chemicals Program, What is the TSCA Chemical Substance 
Inventory?, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/newchems/pubs/invntory.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 
2009). 
76 REACH, supra note 10, art. 119, ¶ 1; see also Denison, supra note 1, at VII-6. 
77 REACH, supra note 10, art. 119, ¶ 2; see also Denison, supra note 1, at VII-6. 
78 REACH, supra note 10, art. 119, ¶ 2(c); see also Denison, supra note 1, at VII-6 & 
n.281. 
79 See REACH, supra note 10, art. 118, ¶ 2; see also Denison, supra note 1, at VII-5, VII-7. 
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urgent action is essential to protect human health, safety or the envi-
ronment, such as emergency situations.”80
II. Toxic Tort Litigation and Scientific Evidence 
 Toxic tort law addresses civil wrongs where an individual or the 
environment has suffered injury or harm due to exposure to a toxic 
product, substance, or process.81 Through toxic tort litigation, victims 
may recover compensatory damages to meet the costs of medical ex-
penses, foregone wages, and pain and suffering. In addition, courts 
sometimes award punitive damages, which are designed to deter de-
fendants and others from engaging in the same or similar harmful be-
havior in the future.82 In toxic tort cases, as in conventional tort suits, 
plaintiffs must establish each of the elements of a prima facie case in 
order to prevail in litigation.83 These elements are duty, breach, injury, 
and causation.84 Establishing causation is almost always the biggest hin-
drance to plaintiffs’ success.85
A. Proving Causation in Toxic Tort Suits 
 In a toxic tort lawsuit, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s tortious conduct 
caused the plaintiff’s harm.86 Generally, in toxic tort bodily injury law-
suits, causation is established where the plaintiff proves that it is more 
likely than not that: (1) the plaintiff was exposed to the toxic substance; 
(2) the defendant was responsible for the exposure; and (3) the plain-
tiff’s exposure caused the claimed injury.87
 Proving causation typically involves establishing both specific and 
general causation.88 To prove specific causation, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the chemical in question did, in fact, cause plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                      
80 REACH, supra note 10, art. 118, ¶ 2. 
81 Mary Elliott Rollé, Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and Procedural Barriers in 
International Toxic Tort Cases, 15 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 135, 140 (2003). 
82 See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 477 (N.J. 1986); Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 171–72 (3d 
ed. 2004). 
83 Plater et al., supra note 82, at 105. 
84 See id. 
85 See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of 
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2121 (1997); Rollé, supra note 81, at 140. 
86 Plater et al., supra note 82, at 227. 
87 Rollé, supra note 81, at 142. 
88 Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 30. 
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particular harm.89 General causation, on the other hand, involves con-
vincing the jury that the toxic substance in question is capable of caus-
ing the disease or injury that the plaintiff has suffered.90
 Establishing general causation is especially challenging in toxic 
tort litigation for a number of reasons.91 First, while scientists have 
made remarkable advances in understanding biological mechanisms as 
related to the onset of illnesses such as cancer, neurological disorders, 
and reproductive malformations, much remains unknown about the 
causes of disease.92 Further, the fact that many illnesses have more than 
one potential cause can make it very difficult to prove that exposure to 
defendant’s product necessarily caused the injury.93 In addition, the 
“probabilistic” evidence that scientists rely upon in developing hy-
potheses and theories may not translate well to the preponderance of 
the evidence standard used by courts and juries.94 Acquiring adequate 
scientific evidence, moreover, can be prohibitively expensive.95 For 
toxic tort plaintiffs, “the trick often has been to find probative evidence 
that can be obtained without great cost.”96
B. Types of Causation Evidence 
 In both the scientific and the legal world, establishing general cau-
sation usually involves complex explanations of causal relationships.97 
Given that straightforward cause-effect linkages are rare in the context 
of toxic tort litigation, scientists rely upon generalizations of their find-
ings to support causal inferences.98 Scientists most commonly look to 
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. at 286. 
90 Id. Because it seems likely that REACH will have very little, if any, impact on the es-
tablishment of plaintiff-specific causation, this Note limits its analysis to proof of general 
causation. In any event, general causation is generally a threshold consideration for courts: 
it is normally the case that courts will exclude evidence on specific causation where plain-
tiff’s evidence is insufficient to establish general causation. Id. at 32. 
91 See Berger, supra note 85, at 2120–21. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 2121–22. 
94 See id. at 2122. 
95 See Plater et al., supra note 82, at 212. 
96 Id. 
97 Berger, supra note 85, at 2120–21. 
98 Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litiga-
tion: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 643, 645–46 
(1991). 
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epidemiological and toxicological studies to provide evidence of a 
causal relationship.99
1. Epidemiology 
 Epidemiology is the statistical study of disease and the factors that 
cause illness in human populations.100 It concerns itself with the inci-
dence and distribution of illnesses in groups of people, rather than in-
dividual patients.101 In the context of toxic tort litigation, epidemiol-
ogical research can provide evidence of a causal relationship between 
exposure to chemical agents and human injury by assessing how much 
incidence of a disease is linked to the substance in question.102 Epide-
miologists define the strength of the association in terms of relative 
risk.103 A relative risk of 1.0 indicates that the incidence of disease in 
exposed and unexposed populations is the same and suggests the ab-
sence of a causal relationship.104 A relative risk of greater than 2.0 is 
necessary for the study to indicate that it is more likely than not that 
subjects exposed to the substance will exhibit a certain disease or ill-
ness.105 “The higher the relative risk, the stronger or more power-
ful . . . the association between the [chemical] and the disease.”106 Cor-
relation does not imply causation, however.107 Associations that imply a 
causal relationship, therefore, are strengthened by similar results from 
further epidemiological or other scientific studies.108
 Although epidemiological studies focus on human populations 
and thus are more easily extrapolated to populations outside the re-
searched group than are other research methods—including live ani-
mal studies—they require significant sums of money and lengthy peri-
ods of time to conduct.109 Furthermore, subjecting human populations 
to suspected agents of disease raises serious ethical concerns.110
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. at 646; see also Howard Marks, Electromagnetic Forces from Overhead High-Voltage 
Transmission of Electricity: Establishing Causation Using Toxicological and Epidemiological Evidence 
Under a Post-Daubert Standard, 13 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 163, 174 (1998). 
100 Marks, supra note 99, at 175. 
101 See id. 
102 Berger, supra note 85, at 2125–26. 
103 Id. at 2126. 
104 Id.; Green, supra note 98, at 647. 
105 See Berger, supra note 85, at 2126. 
106 Green, supra note 98, at 47. 
107 Marks, supra note 99, at 175; see Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 325. 
108 See Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 325; Marks, supra note 99, at 175. 
109 Green, supra note 98, at 646. 
110 See Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 356. 
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2. Toxicology 
 Toxicological studies frequently provide scientifically valid alterna-
tives or supplements to epidemiological research.111 The most common 
and reliable types of toxicological studies are live animal (in vivo) stud-
ies, in vitro (cell, tissue, organ, or embryo) testing, and structure-activity 
relationships (SARs) analysis.112
a. Animal Studies 
 Despite several obvious distinguishing characteristics, human be-
ings have much in common with other animal species.113 “With respect 
to the toxicological effects of chemicals on biological organisms, the 
similarities between humans and other animals are far greater than the 
differences.”114 Thus, by exposing live laboratory animals to chemicals 
and observing the results, scientists can assess the probable effects of 
human exposure to the same substances, as well as the risk that such 
exposure can cause human disease.115 The advantages of animal studies 
are numerous.116 First, live animal testing is much cheaper than epi-
demiological research.117 Likewise, because “many animal species re-
produce readily and have short life cycles,” in vivo studies typically de-
mand less time than their epidemiological counterparts.118 Animal 
studies, moreover, “are experimental, rather than observational, ena-
bling the researcher to better control the environment and reduce the 
likelihood of biases affecting the results.”119 In addition, animal testing 
arguably avoids some of the ethical considerations inherent in human 
studies, thereby allowing researchers to conduct “a wider range of . . . 
tests . . . to provide a more complete picture of toxic effects than is 
available from epidemiological studies.”120 For example, after exposing 
lab animals to chemical substances and observing the results, research-
ers can dissect test subjects and observe “implicated tissue . . . to pro-
                                                                                                                      
111 See Green, supra note 98, at 654. 
112 See Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 349–54; Marks, supra note 99, at 176. 
113 See Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 374. 
114 Id. at 374–75. 
115 Id. at 375. 
116 Green, supra note 98, at 654. 
117 See Marks, supra note 99, at 188. 
118 Green, supra note 98, at 654 (noting that this is especially true of mice, rats, and 
hamsters). 
119 Id. 
120 Patricia E. Lin, Note, Opening the Gates to Scientific Evidence in Toxic Exposure Cases: 
Medical Monitoring and Daubert, 17 Rev. Litig. 551, 578 (1998). 
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vide additional information about the existence of disease and its biol-
ogy.”121
 There are, however, drawbacks to animal studies.122 First, the fact 
that human beings and other animals differ in size, life span, metabo-
lism, etc., means that causal inferences about the effects of human ex-
posure to chemicals based upon observations in other species may be 
less reliable than results from epidemiological studies.123 Similarly, ex-
trapolating results from animal studies to humans requires an assump-
tion that “humans will suffer an adverse effect from a low dose of a sub-
stance, even though laboratory animals are given much higher and 
more constant dosages so as to induce a measurable reaction.”124 Fur-
ther, scientists have yet to determine the extent to which in vivo studies 
“over- or underestimate” human toxicity.125 Despite these limitations, it 
is generally accepted in the toxicology field that animal studies play a 
critical role in predicting the incidence of disease in humans.126
b. In Vitro Testing 
 In vitro testing is a common and inexpensive way to study the bio-
chemical effects of agents on cells, organs, and even embryos.127 In vitro 
studies can provide important information on the toxicity of chemicals 
while limiting controversial testing on live animals.128 Because in vitro 
testing occurs in test tubes or Petri dishes, however, the problem of gen-
eralizing observed effects on cells or organs in isolation to live organ-
isms must be considered.129 Specifically, in vitro research is sometimes 
criticized for failing to consider the “layers of metabolic activity” typically 
characteristic of live test subjects.130 Additionally, because scientists usu-
ally perform these tests on animal tissues, the difficulties with animal-to-
human extrapolation characteristic of live animal studies are also pre-
sent in in vitro analyses.131 Nonetheless, in vitro studies have contributed 
significantly to scientific understanding of the biological mechanisms of 
                                                                                                                      
121 Green, supra note 98, at 654. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. Thus, animal studies raise questions of external validity— “the ability to general-
ize the results of a study of a given population to a different group.” Id. 
124 Berger, supra note 85, at 2124. 
125 Id. 
126 See Green, supra note 98, at 656. 
127 See Berger, supra note 85, at 2123; Green, supra note 98, at 657. 
128 See Lin, supra note 120, at 578, 580–81. 
129 Berger, supra note 85, at 2123–24; see Green, supra note 98, at 657. 
130 Lin, supra note 120, at 580. 
131 Green, supra note 98, at 657. 
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some toxic chemicals.132 Moreover, progress in the science of DNA and 
human stem-cell research promises to drastically reduce the problem of 
animal-to-human extrapolation in the in vitro setting.133
c. Structure-Activity Relationships 
 Finally, scientists also use similarities in the molecular structures of 
chemical agents to assess toxicity.134 These tests are known as structure-
activity relationships (SARs).135 SARs analysis is premised on the idea 
that similar molecules have similar effects.136 Because slight variations 
in the molecular structure of chemicals can create substantially distinct 
effects in humans, however, SARs are most useful for establishing the 
characteristics of certain molecular families, and thereby providing a 
basis for further analysis of chemical effects using other methodologies, 
such as epidemiology, animal, and in vitro studies, as discussed 
above.137
III. Standards for Admissibility of Evidence in U.S.  
Federal Courts 
 Given the highly technical nature of the evidence required to es-
tablish requisite causal links, proving general causation in toxic tort 
cases almost always requires the use of scientific experts to testify on the 
linkages between particular toxic substances and human injury.138 Be-
cause scientific evidence and expert testimony on that evidence are es-
sential to nearly every toxic tort plaintiff’s case, the issue of whether a 
court should admit an expert’s testimony is a highly contentious one in 
many toxic tort suits.139 A court’s determination that a plaintiff’s evi-
dence and testimony are inadmissible will often lead to dismissal of the 
case.140 Therefore, defendants often seek to exclude the testimony of 
causation experts as part of their defense strategy.141
                                                                                                                      
 
132 See id. (noting that “the primary benefit from these tests is not the identification of 
[disease-causing agents] but studying the[ir] biological mechanisms”). 
133 See Telephone interview with Jennifer Sass, Senior Scientist, Natural Res. Def. 
Council, in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 26, 2008). 
134 Marks, supra note 99, at 176. 
135 Id. 
136 See Green, supra note 98, at 658; Marks, supra note 99, at 176. 
137 Green, supra note 98, at 658; Marks, supra note 99, at 176. 
138 Turner W. Branch & Margaret Moses Branch, 6 Litigating Tort Cases § 67:34 
(2008). 
139 Berger, supra note 85, at 2122; Branch & Branch, supra note 138. 
140 Berger, supra note 85, at 2122. Often, but not necessarily, judges decide on defen-
dants’ motions to exclude expert testimony in in limine hearings. Id. at 2122 n.20; see Faig-
2009] Impact of New EU Chemical Regulations on Proof of Causation in U.S. Courts 553 
 To avoid exclusion of expert testimony from trial in federal court, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that proffered evidence meets the re-
quirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.142 Rule 702, which gov-
erns the admissibility of expert testimony in federal court, states that 
“[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or oth-
erwise.”143
 Prior to the implementation of Rule 702, federal courts applied 
the legal standard set forth in Frye v. United States144 to evaluate the ad-
missibility of expert testimony.145 Under the Frye test, courts admitted 
evidence deemed “to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.”146 In 1993, the Supreme Court decided 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,147 ruling that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test.148 In its unanimous deci-
                                                                                                                      
 
man et al., supra note 58, at 14. The jury is not present for in limine hearings. Margaret A. 
Berger, Expert Testimony Trends in Federal Practice, in Opinion and Expert Testimony in 
Federal and State Courts 555 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Jan. 18–19, 2007), avail-
able in Westlaw, SM060 ALI-ABA 205 [hereinafter Berger, Expert Testimony Trends]. 
141 Branch & Branch, supra note 138. 
142 Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 13–16; see Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
143 Fed. R. Evid. 702. In 2000, Congress amended Rule 702 to further describe admis-
sible expert testimony and supporting scientific evidence. Faigman et al., supra note 58, 
at 11–12; see Fed. R. Evid. 702. Specifically, the 2000 amendment provided that an expert 
may testify where: “(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testi-
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied 
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also 
Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 11–12 n.7. This Note focuses exclusively on the admissi-
bility of the evidence underlying an expert’s testimony and assumes, for the purpose of its 
analysis, that the expert in question is qualified to testify. For a general discussion of expert 
witness qualifications, see Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 19–23. 
144 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
145 Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 7. 
146 Frye, 293 F. at 1014; see Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 7. 
147 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
148 Id. at 587; see also Marks, supra note 99, at 170. In Daubert, the mothers of Jason 
Daubert and Eric Schuller sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., alleging that ingestion 
of the company’s anti-morning-sickness drug, Bendectin, during pregnancy had caused 
their sons’ birth defects. 509 U.S. at 582; Marks, supra note 99, at 169. The Daubert 
[p]laintiffs proposed that their experts would testify that Bendectin has a 
chemical structure similar to known teratogens (agents that cause birth de-
fects), that it causes injuries to animal cells in test tubes and to animals in la-
boratories, and that re-analysis of published epidemiological studies showed a 
statistical correlation between exposure to Bendectin and incidence of birth 
defects. 
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sion, the Daubert Court explained the new legal standard for admissibil-
ity of expert testimony and scientific evidence under Rule 702.149
 Whereas Frye had instructed judges to defer to the general consen-
sus of scientific opinion, the Court in Daubert assigned judges the task 
of determining whether the science upon which expert witnesses base 
their testimony is reliable.150 The Court found that Rule 702 obliges the 
trial judge to act as a “gatekeeper,” responsible for evaluating scientific 
evidence for relevance and reliability.151 The Court declared that, ac-
cording to Rule 702, judges must determine at the outset of trials 
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology 
properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”152 The relevance part of 
the inquiry—whether the expert testimony will “assist the trier of fact” 
in assessing a fact in issue—ultimately asks whether an expert’s testi-
mony pertains to the facts of the case.153 The Court held that, under 
Rule 702, an expert’s opinion must “relate to an issue that is actually in 
dispute and must provide a valid scientific connection to the pertinent 
inquiry” as a precondition to admissibility.154
 As to reliability, the Court suggested that trial courts consider the 
following non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) whether the theory or tech-
nique at issue can be tested; (2) whether the science has been subject 
to peer review and publication; (3) whether the technique at issue has a 
known rate of error; and (4) whether and to what extent the theory or 
technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant field.155 In 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (Daubert II), the Ninth Cir-
cuit described an additional factor for judges to consider— “whether 
the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and 
directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litiga-
tion, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for pur-
poses of testifying.”156 Emphasizing that a judge’s ruling on admissibil-
                                                                                                                      
Marks, supra note 99, at 169 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 727 F. Supp. 570, 573–
74 (S.D. Cal. 1989)). 
149 509 U.S. at 587–92. 
150 Id. at 597. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 592–93. 
153 Graham v. Playtex Prods., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 127, 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Dau-
bert, 509 U.S. at 587, 591). 
154 Id. (citing Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 
Minn. L. Rev. 1345, 1351 (1994)); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
155 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94; see also Graham, 993 F. Supp. at 130. 
156 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) [Daubert II]; see also Faigman et al., supra note 
58, at 25 n.73. 
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ity should focus on principles and methodology—not on conclusions— 
Daubert instructed judges to apply such factors in determining whether 
an expert’s “methods and reasoning validly support [his/her] prof-
fered . . . testimony.”157
 According to Daubert, the trial court should admit a plaintiff’s sci-
entific evidence where it concludes that such evidence is both relevant 
and reliable.158 It then becomes the fact finder’s task to decide whether 
the evidence—either by itself or in conjunction with other testimony— 
supports a finding of general causation.159 As the Court recognized in 
Daubert, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-
tional and appropriate means of attacking . . . admissible evidence.”160
 Since Daubert, the Court has issued three other notable opinions 
that have further shaped admissibility analysis in federal courts.161 In 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme Court instructed appellate 
courts to use the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard when de-
termining whether to reverse or uphold district court rulings admitting 
or excluding scientific evidence.162 In practice, application of the abuse 
of discretion standard makes it unlikely that appellate courts will un-
dertake de novo review of lower courts’ admissibility rulings.163
 The Joiner Court also retreated from Daubert’s emphasis on meth-
odology, asserting that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely 
distinct from one another.”164 Joiner requires courts to determine the 
likelihood that an expert witness’s conclusions could reliably result 
                                                                                                                      
157 Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 25; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
158 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1230–31 
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163 See Branch & Branch, supra note 138. 
164 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146; see also Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 30; Branch & 
Branch, supra note 138. 
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from the facts and methodologies upon which they were based.165 In 
Joiner, the Court held that a trial court must exclude evidence which “is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”166 Under 
Joiner, moreover, “[a] court may conclude that there is simply too great 
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”167
 A year and a half later, Kumho Tire, Co. v. Carmichael reaffirmed the 
abuse of discretion standard established in Joiner and extended this 
standard to courts’ decisions concerning which factors to consider 
when evaluating the dependability of expert testimony.168 Kumho Tire, 
which expanded the Daubert relevance and reliability tests to non-
scientific expert testimony, also described the judge’s task in making a 
Daubert ruling as ensuring that experts “employ[] in the courtroom the 
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an ex-
pert in the relevant field.”169
 Finally, in Weisgram v. Marley Co., the Court ruled that plaintiffs are 
entitled to only one opportunity to present admissible scientific evi-
dence and testimony to support causation arguments.170 Specifically, 
the Court held that: 
[A]n appellate court reversing a trial court’s decision to admit 
expert’s testimony need not remand the case to allow the 
party a second chance to cure what the appellate court re-
garded as unreliable evidence (either by allowing the newly 
disqualified expert an opportunity to provide a better expla-
nation of his or her methodologies, reasoning, and conclu-
sions, or by permitting the expert’s sponsoring party the 
chance to find other experts who can either validate the first 
expert’s work and/or substitute for the first expert).171
Justice Ginsberg expressed the Weisgram Court’s reasoning: 
Since Daubert, . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had 
notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence 
must meet . . . . It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert, that 
parties will initially present less than their best expert evi-
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166 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146; see also Miltenberg, supra note 162. 
167 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
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dence in the expectation of a second chance should their first 
try fail.172
 Notably, the Committee Notes on the 2000 revisions to Rule 702 
mention additional factors that other courts have considered when de-
ciding whether scientific expert testimony should be admitted.173 These 
factors include whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvi-
ous alternative explanations, whether the expert “is being as careful as 
he would be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation 
consulting,” and whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is 
known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would 
give.174
IV. Application of Daubert to Toxic Tort Cases 
 An examination of relevant case law reveals that courts generally 
prefer, and commonly admit, evidence based on epidemiological stud-
ies.175 In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court stated that 
epidemiological proof was “the most useful and conclusive type of evi-
dence.”176 Similarly, in Pick v. American Medical Systems, Inc., the Eastern 
District of Louisiana noted “that epidemiological data is very impor-
tant” in determining the relative risk of a product.177 Courts have ad-
mitted testimony based on epidemiological studies in cases alleging in-
jury caused by asbestos, electro-magnetic radiation, tobacco products, 
benzene, solvents, and PCBs, to name a few.178
 The admissibility of expert opinion on all forms of non-
epidemiological studies has been more controversial, and defendants 
frequently attempt to convince courts that Daubert and the Federal 
Rules require epidemiological evidence to establish general causation 
in toxic tort cases.179 Such attempts are usually in vain.180 While it is 
true that courts sometimes have dismissed cases lacking statistically sig-
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nificant epidemiological evidence, the same courts that have required 
epidemiological support in certain cases have also specifically declined 
to hold that epidemiological studies are required in all toxic tort litiga-
tion.181 For example, in Brock, a pre-Daubert decision which Daubert 
cited approvingly, the Second Circuit expressly stated that its holding 
should not be read to signify “that epidemiological proof is a necessary 
element in all toxic tort cases.”182
 One leading commentator in this area has suggested that courts 
are most likely to require epidemiological studies in mass tort litigation, 
whereas judges tend to admit toxicological and other support in cases 
involving just one or a few plaintiffs.183 Courts seem especially reluctant 
to require epidemiological studies of small numbers of plaintiffs where 
such data is unavailable.184
 Often, a court’s determination of whether to admit non-
epidemiological evidence has depended on the existence of contradic-
tory epidemiological evidence.185 For example, in Richardson v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., the D.C. Circuit refused to admit evidence based on 
structure-activity, in vitro, and animal studies because a vast body of 
epidemiological data on the substance in question had failed to link 
exposure to that substance to the kind of reproductive problems suf-
fered by the plaintiff.186 There, the court held that the law “[u]niquely 
. . . ha[d] the benefit of twenty years of scientific study, and the pub-
lished [epidemiological] results [required] . . . their just due.”187 Simi-
larly, the D.C. Circuit in Raynor v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc. found that 
the plaintiffs’ evidence of causation based on live-animal studies, ani-
mal-cell studies, and chemical-structure analyses was insufficient to 
reach the jury, given the extensive epidemiological data supporting the 
opposite conclusion.188
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 In the absence of epidemiological studies, plaintiffs are more likely 
to succeed at having expert testimony based on toxicology reach the 
jury.189 For instance, in Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., a case in which nei-
ther plaintiff nor the defendant proposed epidemiological evidence of 
a causal connection between Tylenol and liver damage, the Fourth Cir-
cuit explained: “Under the Daubert standard, epidemiological studies 
are not necessarily required to prove causation, as long as the method-
ology employed by the expert in reaching his or her conclusion is 
sound.”190 Likewise, in Ambrosini v. Labarraque, the court noted that, 
“[e]ven where a party has admitted that no biochemical or epidemiol-
ogical test has been done that can conclusively establish a link between 
a drug and an illness . . . expert evidence on the subject is not rendered 
inadmissible.”191 Quoting an EPA toxicologist, the Third Circuit in In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation stated that, “[i]n the absence of epidemi-
ologic proof in humans we must drop to our second tier in the under-
standing of human [disease] prediction: Animal testing.”192
 Courts have also admitted toxicological data where no epidemiol-
ogical studies exist due to ethical considerations.193 For example, in 
Dawsey v. Olin Corp., a federal court admitted toxicological evidence 
based on animal studies, where construction-worker plaintiffs suffered 
injuries after being exposed to a cloud of phosgene gas at work.194 
There, conducting epidemiological studies would have required expos-
ing humans to potentially toxic substances; such studies would have 
been unethical.195 The court concluded that the absence of epidemiol-
ogical evidence was not grounds for dismissal because “[s]hort of inten-
tionally exposing humans to phosgene, it would be difficult to learn 
any more about the effects of [the chemical].”196
 In such circumstances, courts repeatedly have observed that objec-
tions to the admissibility of non-epidemiological evidence are better 
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suited to “‘the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence,’ i.e., ‘[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation 
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof 
. . . .’”197 It would seem, therefore, that toxicological evidence is rarely 
per se inadmissible.198 Courts often express concerns, however, about 
the questions of external validity that may be raised by using toxicologi-
cal evidence to support causal inferences.199 Accordingly, courts look 
closely at the analytical leaps an expert may have taken to extrapolate 
toxicological data to human injury—the greater the gap, the less will-
ing a court is likely to be to allow testimony to reach a jury.200
 Courts generally find in vivo studies to be the most reliable type of 
non-epidemiological evidence.201 Still, many courts are hesitant to allow 
testimony based on animal studies to reach a jury, if the studied sub-
stance, injury, or dose rate differs from that at issue in the case.202 Tes-
timony based on in vitro studies and SARs are least likely to be admit-
ted.203 “For most courts, the admissibility of toxicological evidence 
turns on the quality of other types of admissible data—especially epi-
demiological data—and the degree to which toxicological findings ad-
dress the specific causal questions . . . .”204
V. Will REACH Data Assist Plaintiffs with Establishing 
General Causation? 
A. Will REACH Cover the Chemical in Question? 
 In analyzing the likelihood that REACH will assist U.S. plaintiffs in 
establishing general causation, the first step is to determine whether 
the new regulations will generate data on the chemical substance 
claimed to have caused the plaintiff’s injury. Because REACH requires 
the submission of data on the majority of chemicals in use today, in 
most instances REACH likely will cover the chemical in question.205 
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There are notable exceptions, however, that may limit REACH’s utility 
to some American plaintiffs.206
 For example, REACH exempts manufacturers and importers of 
substances in quantities of less than one ton per year from REACH reg-
istration.207 This exception to the “no data, no market” principle208 re-
flects a policy decision by EU member states that the limited risk of ex-
posure in such instances fails to warrant regulatory action.209 The fact 
that EU regulators have determined that the costs of testing and com-
pliance with the REACH process sufficiently outweigh the benefits of 
extending REACH requirements to these substances, however, does not 
mean that injuries from exposure to such chemicals are impossible or 
will not occur.210 Thus, in exempting such low-volume substances, 
REACH may fail to provide at least some plaintiffs with probative evi-
dence on general causation.211
 REACH also provides registrants with the opportunity to appeal 
ECHA decisions that demand testing beyond that required for registra-
tion compliance.212 Notably, this appeals process provides manufactur-
ers and importers with an additional means of attempting to avoid the 
submission of complete data on chemicals and may likewise result in an 
information gap for interested plaintiffs.213
 Moreover, for manufacturers and importers of certain substances, 
REACH only requires testing proposals—not actual safety and health 
data.214 The extent to which the “testing proposal” provisions of 
REACH will limit the chemicals actually studied under the legislation 
remains to be seen. While REACH instructs ECHA to evaluate all test-
ing proposals to determine whether proposed studies are needed to 
adequately assess health risks of particular substances, it seems likely 
that ECHA will refrain from requiring actual testing of some chemi-
cals.215 Further, at least some manufacturers and importers can be ex-
pected to submit testing proposals in lieu of actual data, so as to mini-
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mize costs and limit REACH scrutiny.216 The more rigorously ECHA 
pursues actual testing, the more likely it will be that data concerning 
chemicals under scrutiny in American litigation will be available to 
plaintiffs. 
 Finally, REACH may not cover certain chemicals because manufac-
turers or importers may choose not to market them in the post-REACH 
EU.217 For example, registrants may decide to switch to safer, less toxic 
alternatives for EU consumers prior to REACH registration dead-
lines.218 Since REACH only applies to chemicals manufactured in or 
imported into the European Union, some substances that manufactur-
ers continue to produce for American consumption may never be reg-
istered under REACH, thereby depriving U.S. plaintiffs of access to 
health-toxicity data that REACH otherwise would have provided.219
B. Will Plaintiffs Have Sufficient Access to REACH Data? 
 Assuming that REACH will generate data on a substance alleged to 
have caused a plaintiff’s injury, the next step is to consider whether 
REACH will provide U.S. plaintiffs, attorneys, and experts adequate 
access to the relevant information. On the positive side, REACH repre-
sents a significant improvement over previous European chemicals leg-
islation which typically neither mandated nor encouraged public dis-
closure of environmental and health safety information.220 On the 
negative side, however, because REACH attempts to balance industry 
concerns for keeping certain “proprietary” information secret against 
the public’s need to access safety data, the new chemicals legislation 
may not always provide plaintiffs with adequate information.221
 At a minimum, the data that REACH promises to make available to 
the public on the ECHA website should familiarize plaintiffs with the 
list of substances most scrutinized under REACH, including chemicals 
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that ECHA has determined pose the greatest and/or best understood 
risks to human health and the environment.222 For example, Article 
119 of REACH provides that ECHA shall post data on the substances 
that ECHA has chosen to evaluate, dossiers prepared on substances 
proposed for authorization and restriction, and final Agency committee 
opinions concerning restriction decisions.223 Similarly, the ECHA web-
site will publish information on the classification and labeling of sub-
stances and analytical methods that make it possible to detect a dan-
gerous substance when discharged into the environment, as well as to 
determine the direct exposure to humans.224 Where this information 
enables experts and courts to understand which theories and method-
ologies REACH registrants have used in developing technical data, it 
should likewise aid plaintiffs in establishing Daubert relevance and reli-
ability.225
 Article 119 also requires that ECHA publish online physicochemi-
cal data concerning registered substances, information on pathways 
and environmental fate, and results of each toxicological and ecotoxi-
cological study.226 For plaintiffs, having this information in most cases 
should be better than having none at all.227 Nonetheless, plaintiffs will 
likely require more detailed information if they are to convince U.S. 
federal courts of the admissibility of such evidence.228 Specifically, to 
make determinations about the admissibility of data and results under 
Daubert, federal “gatekeeping” judges can be expected to inquire into 
the methodologies used to achieve them.229
 Fortunately for plaintiffs, REACH will make methodology-specific 
information available unless the manufacturer or importer petitions 
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against its publication.230 It is reasonable to expect, however, that those 
registrants intent on protecting as much information about potentially 
harmful products as possible will petition early and often.231 ECHA has 
yet to develop criteria to evaluate the validity of nondisclosure re-
quests.232 Therefore, it is presently unclear how severely plaintiffs’ ac-
cess to methodological information will be limited under REACH.233 
Seemingly, the more petitions that ECHA honors, the more difficult it 
will be for plaintiffs and their experts to access critical information. 
C. Will Plaintiffs Want to Use REACH Data: Can Registrant  
Studies Be Trusted? 
 Further assuming that plaintiffs are able to access relevant data 
through REACH, the next step is to consider the likelihood that 
REACH data will point to a causal relationship between exposure to the 
substance in question and the applicable disease. Given that REACH 
makes manufacturers responsible for studying and managing the risks 
of the chemicals they produce,234 and that ECHA is responsible for 
evaluating only a “certain percentage” of the hundreds of thousands of 
registrations it will receive,235 it seems likely that some registrants will get 
away with submitting less-than-reliable data of little value to plaintiffs.236
 There can be no question that industry has every incentive to in-
terpret data they develop to their advantage, thereby avoiding possible 
restrictions on access to the EU market.237 As such, “it is difficult to 
imagine that many of the assessments submitted by industry will indi-
cate significant risk [posed by] the chemicals in question.”238 Because 
under REACH, “government largely plays an oversight role, with au-
thority—but only limited obligation—to evaluate industry’s assess-
ments, require more information or testing, or impose controls,” it 
seems that the reliability of REACH data for plaintiffs often will hinge 
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on the extent to which ECHA and EU Member States take seriously 
their evaluation, authorization, and restriction roles.239
 On the other hand, it is possible that REACH-registered data itself 
may be reliable, while the registrant’s risk assessments based on that 
data are questionable. This set of circumstances may pose less of a 
problem for plaintiffs, and for expert witnesses who may be able to 
draw different conclusions from the data in support of the plaintiff’s 
claims.240 In either situation, increasing the frequency, thoroughness, 
and independence of ECHA evaluations of industry data will lead to a 
greater likelihood that REACH will produce reliable information that is 
useful to plaintiffs in establishing causation.241
D. Will REACH-Based Evidence Pass Daubert Muster? 
 Where REACH provides reliable data that a plaintiff would like to 
use to establish general causation, the litigant finally must consider 
whether the relevant REACH data will satisfy criteria for admission to 
U.S. federal courts, as stipulated in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.242 To 
determine whether REACH data will meet Rule 702 requirements, it is 
necessary to assess the information under the Supreme Court’s analysis 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and subsequent cases.243 
According to Daubert, success under Rule 702 requires that “the reason-
ing or methodology underlying the testimony [be] scientifically valid 
and . . . that [the] reasoning or methodology properly can be applied 
to the facts in issue.”244 The REACH data upon which an expert bases 
his or her testimony, therefore, must be both relevant and reliable.245
 The relevance inquiry is usually straightforward—a simple matter 
of whether the data upon which testimony is based provides evidence 
linking exposure to the substance in question to the disease suffered by 
the plaintiff.246 As long as the REACH data and the expert’s opinion on 
that data relate to the “issue that is actually in dispute [in the case] and 
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. . . provide a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry,” there 
should be little serious questioning of the data’s relevance.247
 The trial judge’s assessment of reliability, on the other hand, tends 
to be more complex.248 To determine whether “the subject of an ex-
pert’s testimony [is valid] scientific knowledge” —that is, an under-
standing of the information grounded “in the methods and procedures 
of science” and based upon “more than subjective belief or unsup-
ported speculation”249—trial courts are likely to consider the following 
non-exhaustive list of factors suggested in Daubert: (1)whether the the-
ory or technique at issue can be tested; (2) whether the science has 
been subject to peer review and publication; (3) whether the technique 
at issue has a known rate of error; and (4) whether and to what extent 
the theory or technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant 
field.250 Courts may also consider “whether the experts are proposing 
to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research 
they have conducted independent of the litigation.”251 To predict 
whether courts will view REACH data as satisfying these factors, it is 
helpful to examine how courts since Daubert have confronted the issue 
of which types of scientific evidence are valid and whether REACH will 
generate these kinds of evidence.252
 Courts generally have preferred and admitted testimony based on 
epidemiological studies.253 REACH, however, does not require manu-
facturers to develop and register epidemiological data.254 REACH does 
request that registrants submit pre-existing data, such as epidemiologi-
cal studies, where available, during the registration process, but regis-
trants are never required to include this information in technical dossi-
ers or CSRs.255 Because epidemiological data often provides the 
strongest basis for inferences causally linking various chemicals to dis-
ease, it is unlikely that registrants would voluntarily submit epidemiol-
ogical data demonstrating adverse effects.256 Nonetheless, where 
                                                                                                                      
247 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Graham, 993 F. Supp. at 130. 
248 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
249 Id. at 590. 
250 See id. at 593–94; Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 23–24. 
251 Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Faigman et al., supra note 58, 
at 25 n.73. 
252 See Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 283, 343. 
253 See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1989), modified on 
reh’g, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989); Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 
(E.D. La. 1997). 
254 See, e.g., REACH, supra note 10, Annex XI; see also Denison, supra note 1, at IV-28. 
255 See REACH, supra note 10, Annexes VII–X. 
256 See Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 283; Denison, supra note 1, at iv, I-9. 
2009] Impact of New EU Chemical Regulations on Proof of Causation in U.S. Courts 567 
REACH data includes statistically significant epidemiological studies, 
federal courts are likely to deem them admissible.257
 The fact that REACH will produce little if any epidemiological 
data—instead relying on non-epidemiological studies to evaluate the 
health and safety effects of chemical substances—should not, in and of 
itself, preclude plaintiffs from using REACH data as probative evidence 
of general causation in most cases.258 While it is true that courts some-
times have found a failure to present statistically significant epidemiol-
ogical proof to be fatal to a case, the same courts that have required 
epidemiological evidence in some instances have also specifically de-
clined to hold that epidemiological studies are required in all toxic tort 
litigation.259 Reliance on precedent indicates that if proffered, non-
epidemiological REACH data contradicts extensive epidemiological 
data, its chances of survival are at their lowest ebb.260 In the absence of 
a vast body of epidemiological studies to the contrary, however, REACH 
data based on toxicological methods—such as animal studies, in vitro 
testing, and SARs—are likely to be admitted under Daubert.261
 Courts are least likely to require epidemiological support from in-
dividual plaintiffs.262 Therefore, REACH toxicological data may be 
most beneficial to non-mass tort litigants.263 Further, according to the 
court in Dawsey v. Olin, sometimes the ethical and practical dilemmas 
associated with epidemiological studies are insurmountable, and in 
vivo, in vitro, and SARs studies can provide methodologically sound 
substitutes for epidemiology.264 Accordingly, in situations where, 
“[s]hort of intentionally exposing humans to [the substance in ques-
tion], it would be difficult to learn any more about the effects of [the] 
chemical” and its relationship to a particular disease without toxico-
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logical studies, courts are likely to find it prudent to rely upon evidence 
based upon animal studies, in vitro testing, and SARs analyses.265
 Thus, the good news for REACH plaintiffs is that federal court 
precedent seems to establish that Daubert allows for the admission of 
toxicological evidence266—the type of data that REACH will provide.267 
The downside, however, is that REACH simply is unlikely to provide 
plaintiffs with the most conclusive types of non-epidemiological evi-
dence.268 While courts have generally found in vivo studies to be the 
most reliable form of toxicology,269 REACH expressly discourages ani-
mal testing out of concerns for animal welfare and a desire to minimize 
costs to industry.270 By providing for alternative methods to direct ani-
mal testing, REACH essentially invites industry to avoid the types of 
studies that are most likely—in a courtroom—to solidify causal links be-
tween substances and carcinogenic, teratogenic, and mutagenic ef-
fects.271 Courts may decide to admit REACH data based on in vitro stud-
ies and SARs analysis but are likely to do so only when other, weightier 
admissible evidence also supports the claimed causal connection.272
Conclusion 
 While REACH may from time to time provide plaintiffs with access 
to additional evidence useful for establishing general causation in toxic 
tort litigation, plaintiffs should keep in mind that REACH data, by it-
self, is unlikely to support claims linking a particular substance to a 
claimed injury. To ensure that proffered evidence of general causation 
reaches the jury, plaintiffs are advised to rely primarily—and exten-
sively—on traditional supporting sources. 
 Looking forward, one may also be hopeful that various amend-
ments to REACH, closing current loopholes advantageous to regis-
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trants, could render REACH data more beneficial to toxic tort plain-
tiffs. Moreover, as REACH amasses its chemical data, the scientific un-
derstanding of biological mechanisms and causal relationships to be 
derived from such data likewise will continue to grow. For this reason, 
REACH may prove increasingly useful to plaintiffs over time, despite its 
current limitations, assuming that courtroom evaluations of methodo-
logical validity adapt accordingly. 
 Although REACH may provide additional data in support of some 
toxic tort plaintiffs’ claims, it seems clear that reliance on the new EU 
chemicals regime is insufficient to adequately protect American con-
sumers from the potential dangers of everyday chemicals. In light of 
increasing awareness of the serious health and environmental conse-
quences associated with exposure to everyday chemicals, Americans 
deserve more from their government. Accordingly, immediate steps 
towards overhauling federal chemicals regulation—on this side of the 
Atlantic—are imperative. 
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